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This article is descriptive in nature and it tries to ascertain the various 
formulas used by federal government of Nigeria to allocate Revenue from 
federation account and their socio-economic impact on the states and local 
government councils.  Primary and secondary data were adequately made use 
of in the study.  Analysis was done using simple percentages in tables, graphs 
and statistical tests by use of students T-Test and correlation co-efficient. 
Major findings in this study include; the socio-economic status of the states 
and local councils are not significantly influenced by the level of Revenue 
accruing to them from the federation account; Interest to share in the 
Revenues accruing to states from federation account has a strong influence 
on the demand for new states.  Moreover, Revenue allocation has been a very 
contentious issue and a source of worry to every government in Nigeria. The 
recommendations in this study include; 
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 Since higher amounts of Revenue from federation account has not 
guaranteed higher socio-economic status of the States, other alternatives for 
improving the socio-economic status of the states should be encouraged; 
Diversification of Nigerian economy may allay the fear on resource control 
and reduce the level of dependence on federation account. 
Introduction 
 Nigeria has progressively evolved from unitary system of government since 
1914 with strong decentralized components (regions). The regions (Northern, 
southern and the eastern) as were created by sir Arthur Richard, the colonial 
administrator, became the bedrock under which the revenue sharing formula 
emanated. Authority and Resources have continued increasingly to be 
concentrated at ‘Federal level’, a trend which went along with the 
atomization of the country’s geographical units due to the fissiparous nature 
of Nigerian’s federalism. In order to properly understand inter –governmental 
fiscal relationship inherent in the 3 –tiers of government in Nigeria and to 
appreciate the problems of jurisdiction over public revenue in the country, 
one should be acquainted with the type of political evolutionary process that 
resulted in the Nigerian federalism. But suffice it to say that the 2nd half of 
the 19th century witnessed a period of active British diplomatic, political, and 
military manipulations of administrative process in West Africa. Such 
manipulations resulted in the creation of the Lagos colony in 1861, although, 
the Berlin conference of 1885 paved way for  the declaration of the 
protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1893 and that of the Northern Nigeria in 
1900. Despite the regional system put in place, the unity of the federation 
was strained seriously by ethnic, religious and political differences. Hence, 
Revenue collection and allocation mechanism was a major source of conflict 
in the regions and in the political parties in Nigeria. In their reaction to the 
state of affairs in Nigeria, Post and Vickers (1973); opines, ‘since the early 
1950’s, one of the major grievances of various sections had been that their 
wealth was being used to subsidize poorer ones and the growing exploitation 
of oil deposits in the East and Mid-West in the 1960’s also added to the fire 
which had been lit long before then.’  More so, not only the mobilization of 
material resources but their distribution was an important source of inter-
sectional competition and conflict, coupled with constant accusation of unfair 
treatment. 
The history of Nigeria’s revenue allocation system has witnessed significant 
shifts from principle of fiscal decentralization and then back again to fiscal 
centralization. The adoption of a federal system of government in 1954, the 
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advent of military rule in 1966, and the outbreak of Nigerian Civil War in 
1967 were the most significant factors behind these shifts. Nigeria’s revenue 
allocation system was dominated by the principle of fiscal centralization for 
several years before the country was federalized in 1954. However, the 
earliest step towards fiscal decentralization was made in 1946 when Nigeria 
was divided into three regions. The 1946 Constitution which recognized 
Nigeria also gave the regional governments “a large measure of financial 
responsibility” requiring revenue powers (Adedeji 1969:49). Despite the 
regions’ expenditure responsibilities, the supreme fiscal powers remained 
with the central government, since the country continued as a unitary state. 
At that time, the central government controlled all national revenues, except 
for the direct or poll tax which was levied and collected by the regional 
governments (Nnoli 1995:95).     
Statement of Problem 
 The tendency of resource allocation or distribution to foment conflict in a 
plural society like Nigeria is an issue that requires careful consideration. 
 The agitation of ethnic minorities (Niger Delta People) over the management 
and ownership of Nigeria's oil resources which account for more than 80% of 
total revenue accruing to Nigeria demands solution. This agitation basically 
rests on revenue allocation system. The issue of how much of the centrally 
collected revenue that should be retained by the federal government and how 
much that should be allocated to state governments is still an issue to be 
permanently resolved. The relevance of the agitation for new states to 
revenue allocation and the sharing of federal units based on the hierarchy of 
power within the five ethno-regional elite groups in the country seem to be a 
source of worry to the federal government.   
Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of the study are as stated below:  
1. To determine reasons for the constant change in revenue sharing 
formula of the federal government. 
2. To examine the relationship between the demand for new states and 
interest to share in the national ‘oil windfall’ from federation 
account. 
3. To examine if there is a significant impact of revenue allocations on 
the Socio-economic status of the States.  
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4. To ascertain if the states with higher amount of allocations from 
federation account show better signs of economic development. 
Research Questions 
1. Is mobilization of revenue more effective in fiscal centralism than in 
fiscal decentralism? 
2. Do States with higher revenue allocations from the federation 
account show better signs of economic development? 
3. Does interest in sharing in the revenue allocation from federation 
account influence demand for new States? 
Significance of the Study 
This study is very relevant to both the politicians, academics and the general 
public since it highlights vital variables in Revenue allocation and its 
implications on the states. This article examines the truth in the view that 
some ethnic groups in Nigeria crave for new states in order to have a share of 
Revenue allocation accruable to states. According to Smith 1981, “the 
creation of more states in areas of the dominant elite groups led to 
dissatisfaction by the minority elite groups with the state creation. The 
minority elite were upset by the failure of their expectations that the creation 
of states would produce viable federation” 
Knowledge of the trend in the Revenue allocation sharing formula will help 
us to appreciate the politics of revenue allocation in Nigeria.      
Scope of the Study 
 Jurisdiction in our context refers to the scope of the constitutional powers of 
the Federal government to legislate on the modalities by which money in the 
federation account and other federally collected revenue are allocated to the 
Federal, States and Local government councils in Nigeria. This article 
examined the impact of allocation of revenue from the federation account on 
the States and not necessarily on how they are raised or collected.   
Theoretical Framework 
From pre –independence period to date, there have been various power 
relations that existed between various communities and levels of government 
in this country which gave rise to the application of various Revenue 
allocation formulas. What happened was that the pre-independence 
constitutional allocation of powers has a relationship with revenue allocation 
basis, which influenced the revenue allocation formulas adopted by the 
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Government in those periods. Those periods were when the mainstay of 
Nigeria economy was Groundnut from the North, cocoa from the West and 
palm produce from the East, Derivation had a weight of 50%.The distribution 
of these resources then fitted the tripodal power equation of Nigeria between 
the three main ethnic groups.               
Trends in Nigeria’s Revenue Allocation System 
Trends in Nigeria’s Revenue allocation system can be viewed from two 
major principles: first, the principle of fiscal centralization at the vertical 
level and the principle of fiscal equity (decentralization) at the horizontal 
level.  
Fiscal centralization: Proponents of fiscal centralization argue that the federal 
government should control greater part of national revenue and use it to 
achieve even development in all parts of Nigeria. They also claim that the 
federal government deserves a greater share of the national revenue because 
it bears responsibility of ensuring political, social and economic stability in 
the country. This idea is shared by the Raisman Commission set up in 1958 
to recommend the revenue allocation arrangement for the post-colonial 
Nigeria. To the Commission, the financial stability of the Federal centre must 
be the main guarantee of the financial stability of Nigeria as a whole, and 
….by its strength and solvency, the credit-worthiness of the country will be 
appraised” (Akindele 1979:183). “The Phillipson Commission was required 
among other things to determine the amount of revenue to be made available 
to the regions. First, such revenues must be identifiable within the region and 
locally collected by regional authorities. Secondly, such revenue must also be 
revenues over which no “national or important considerations of national 
policy” were likely to arise” (Ashawe 1986:26). Based on these criteria, the 
commission declared revenues from direct taxes, licensing fees, mining rents, 
rent from property, and rents from government departments as regional 
revenues. Non-regional (non-declared) revenues were therefore revenues that 
did not meet the above criteria. These criteria are clearly demarcated in table 
A in appendix I. A cursory look at this table also reveals that majority of the 
major sources of revenue are under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Government.  
“The Phillipson Commission proposed two principles for allocating non-
regional revenues: the principle of derivation and the principle of “even 
progress” or even development (measured by population). On the basis of 
derivation, the Commission recommended that each region would receive, in 
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addition to the full amount of its share of declared regional revenues, a block 
grant from the revenue accruing to the central government in proportion to its 
relative contribution to such central revenue” (Suberu 2001:49). 
With the implementation of the recommendations of the Chicks Commission 
and the eventual granting of self-government to the regions in 1956, the 
federal government lost its fiscal ascendancy over the regions, and the 
principle of fiscal centralization was replaced with that of fiscal 
decentralization. The effect of these decentralist measures was remarkable, 
“whereas in 1951-52…regional revenue was only twenty-four percent of 
central government revenue, under the 1954 fiscal system the federal and 
regional governments shared the total current revenue sources of Nigeria on 
about a fifty-fifty basis” (Adedeji 1969:112-113).. 
Since 1970, there has been a persistent trend towards fiscal centralization, 
although minor exceptions can be observed. The data in Table B shows that 
despite several amendments to the vertical revenue sharing formula since 
1970, the federal government consistently maintained its control over almost 
a half of the revenue in the Federation Account. As can be seen in the table, 
in 1980, the federal government enjoyed a disproportionate share of the 
Federal Account based on the formula of 53:30:10: In 1982, the formula 
changed to fifty-five percent to federal, thirty-four percent to states, and ten 
percent to local governments, respectively. Currently, the federal government 
enjoys 52.68% of the federal revenue, while the states and local governments 
have 26.72% and 20.60%, respectively. Except for 1994, the federal 
government has held at least fifty percent of the revenue in the Federation 
Account since 1980. Derivation percentage on mineral producing areas of 
13% has been very consistent since January 2009.    
Fiscal Decentralization:  
Proponents of this principle want the state and local governments to control 
greater share of the national revenue since their activities have direct impact 
on the people. The horizontal revenue allocation has produced as much, if not 
more, contention as the vertical intergovernmental transfer. Arriving at 
appropriate formula for interstate revenue sharing is one of the most 
combustible issues in Nigerian politics. Thus, the states (organized around 
ethno-regional elite groups) are divided over the appropriate principles for 
sharing revenues accruing from the Federation Account. Table C shows the 
control of these elite groups by states. The importance of states per region is 
very significant because federal revenue and offices are distributed equally 
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among the states.  Table C also reveals one aspect of role of state creation in 
Nigerian’s distributive politics because some issues like appointment into 
federal executive and government agencies, and citing of federal projects are 
done based on state representation.  However, the share of revenue by 
principle of Derivation since 1960 is as shown in Table D.  
The differences in views and preferences are based on the strategic 
calculations of the states – since they have unequal revenue mobilization 
capacities, each state seeks the formula that would offer it the greatest 
advantage. Since 1946, the government has devised about twenty horizontal 
revenue sharing formulas but none of them have enjoyed complete 
acceptance. The criterion of population has dominated the horizontal revenue 
allocation formula. Table E shows the weight of these criteria was reduced 
marginally from fifty percent each in 1970s to forty percent each in the 
1980s. Since the 1990s, the weight attached to population has further been 
reduced to thirty percent. Presently, forty percent (the largest share) of the 
revenue from the Federation Account is shared among the states based on the 
criterion of equality of states. This means that each state receives an equal 
share of this portion of the Federation Account regardless of the state’s 
population or contribution to the Federation Account.  
The excessive reliance on the criterion of equality of states is justified on a 
number of grounds. First, it is argued that the principle recognizes the reality 
that each state government has a minimum responsibility, which is to sustain 
a basic set of public functions and institutions irrespective of its geographical 
size, population or fiscal capacity. . . compensates states that could not 
benefit from other criteria due to their small geographical size, population or 
financial capacity (Suberu 2001:59). However, Suberu, (1998), argues that 
the use of equality of states criterion in revenue allocation is an incentive to 
the endless demands for the creation of new states. Alm and Boex, (2002), 
argues also that use of equity principles in revenue sharing leads to high rate 
of efficiency losses because it frees the states from the effect of scale of 
economies, for instance, the expenditures of the new states not only include 
the construction and operation of new state administrative facilities, but also 
some non-essential facilities funded by the states. Table F shows an overview 




Jurisdiction Impact of Revenue Allocation on States and LG Councils in Nigeria 
 
Copyright © IAARR, 2010: www.afrrevjo.com                                           83 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
Methodology 
 In order to effectively carry out this study, secondary data were drawn from 
current journals, books and the primary data were analyzed using tables, 
graph, and percentages while statistical tests were carried out using T-test 
and correlation co-efficient. 
We used two main variables to highlight the impact of Revenue allocation to 
the states including the local government councils.  These two main variables 
were the education attainments within the states and the utilization of certain 
demographic factors within the States; Also, 100 sets of questionnaire were 
issued to the sampled population of individuals in Enugu State (including 
members of Enugu State legislature and the academia). 
 Analysis of Data 
In tables G and H, in appendices VII and VIII, the country was grouped into 
six geo-political zones for a quick overview of jurisdiction impact of revenue 
allocation on the states of the federation regarding their developments in 
terms of educational attainments and other demographic indicators.   
Statistical Comments 
Female child, no education is significantly higher than male child particularly 
in the northern regions (p<0.05), while male and female child education in 
primary and secondary schools are generally lower in the Northern regions 
especially in the North East (p>0.05). For tertiary institutions, there was a 
significant variance in male education than female (p<0.05). However, 
household education attainment was significantly higher in Southern regions 
than the North (p<0.05). Thus, revenue allocation accruing to states from 
federation account is relatively not a factor with regards to educational 
development. 
From Table H in appendix VIII: 
Sig. =  * Use of demographic amenities differ significantly with 
regions  
Very sig. = ** 
Very highly sig. = ***  
 The variance in use of certain demographic factors is equally very high. The 
statistical test reveals that even though Northern regions received more 
allocations, there are more significant provision of electricity and portable 
water in the Southern regions (p<0.05).The other socio-economic indicators, 
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other than electricity and portable water are equally provided in all the 
regions irrespective of the revenues allocated to them (p>0.05). 
Figure 1 is a graph of the relationships between Revenue allocations and 
developments in the regions. This can be seen in appendix IX. This graph 
indicates a low degree of correlation between level (amount) of revenue 
allocation from federation account to the States and educational attainments 
and use of certain demographic factors.  
Findings 
The number of states in a region tends to influence number of appointments 
into federal executive and other federal appointments including citing of 
federal projects. 
It was also found that despite the huge amount of Revenue allocation to 
Northern regions they faired less in terms of educational attainments. Also 
found out was that the use of certain amenities by the regions was not 
significantly influenced by the level of revenue accruable to the regions from 
the federation account. The effectiveness of revenue mobilization process is 
not dependent on whether the fiscal policies is centralized or decentralized 
but on the effectiveness of implementation process. 
Conclusion 
The three main regions in Nigeria have remained the bedrock from which the 
framework for Revenue allocation started.  Although, Revenue allocation is a 
source of unification, it has remained very contentious and a source of worry 
to every government in Nigeria.  Comparatively, Revenue allocations to the 
Northern regions have not significantly improved their socio-economic status 
more than that of southern regions. 
Recommendations 
Following are the recommendations: 
Diversification of Nigerian economy should be encouraged in order to reduce 
the contentions over revenue allocation since majority of the states will attain 
a high degree of self-reliance.  There should be a judicious application of the 
Revenues accruing to the states from the Federation account.  The Northern 
regions are to look inwards for improvement of their socio-economic status 
since higher amount of Revenue allocations has not guaranteed higher socio-
economic status. 
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Table A: Nigeria Major Tax Jurisdiction and Right to Revenue (1999) 
Types of tax Jurisdiction  Right to revenue 
 Law Administration 
and collection 
 
1. Import duties Federal  Federal Federation account 
2. Exercise duties Federal Federal Federation account 
3. Export duties Federal Federal Federation account 
4. Mining rents and royalties  Federal Federal Federation account 
5. Petroleum profit tax Federal Federal Federation account 
6. Company income tax Federal Federal Federation account 
7. Capital gains tax Federal Federal State 
8. Personal Income tax Federal  State 
9. Personal income tax: armed forces, 
external affairs, non resident, residents 
of the FCT and Nigerian police 
Federal Federal Federal 
10. Licensing fees on television and 
wireless radio 
Federal Local Local 
11. Stamp duties Federal Federal/State Local 
12. Capital transfer tax (CTT) Federal Federal State 
13. Value added tax Federal Federal Federal/State 
14. Pools betting and other betting taxes State State State  
15. Motor Vehicle and  drivers license State State State 
16. Entertainment tax State State State 
17. Land registration and survey fees State State State 
18. Property taxes and survey fees State Local Local 
19. Market and trading license and fees State Local Local 
Source: Nigeria Constitution 1999.  





1982 1984 1990 1992 1994 Since 
2004 – 
2009 
1.Federal Government 53.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 50.0 50.0 48.5 52.68 
2. Regional/State 
Governments 
30.0 30.5 34.5 32.5 30.0 25.0 24.0 26.72 
3. Local Governments 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 20.0 20.60 
4. Special Funds 
(i) Federal Capital Territory 
(ii) Derivation 
(iii) Development of Oil 
producing Areas 
(iv) General Ecology 

























































TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources: Adapted from Anyanwu (1997:190), The Guardian, 12 September 
2000: 53. Updated from 2004 to 2009 by field survey – FAAC Releases 
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  Table C: Breakdown of Revenue Allocation to states, June 1999 – July 2004 





% of Amt 
allocated 
% of  total 
pop.2006 
Est. 
 Northern States 
1 Adamawa Fulani 50.424 2.1 2.26 
2 Buachi Hausa 56.248 2.38 3.34 
3 Borno Kanuri 55.628 2.35 2.96 
4 Gombe  Fulani 41.776 1.77 1.68 
5 Jigawa Hausa 51.075 2.16 3.10 
6 Kaduna Hausa 65.422 2.77 4.33 
7 Kano Hausa 80.127 3.39 6.70 
8 Katsina Hausa 62.905 2.66 4.13 
9 Kebbi Hausa 49.452 2.09 2.31 
10 Nasarawa Hausa 38.540 1.6 1.33 
11 Niger Nupe/Hausa 57.488 2.4 2.82 
12 Sokoto Hausa 50.907 2.15 2.64 
13 Yobe Kanuri 47.102 1.99 1.65 
14 Zamfara Hausa/Fulani 49.468 2.09 2.32 
   756.562 31.90 41.57 
 Western (Yoruba) States 
15 Kwara Yoruba  44.469 1.88 1.69 
16 Ekiti Yoruba 38.675 1.6 1.70 
17 Lagos Yoruba 85.833 3.64 6.43 
18 Ogun Yoruba 52.077 2.2 2.66 
19 Ondo Yoruba 73.471 3.1 2.45 
20 Osun Yoruba 47.700 2.0 2.44 
21 Oyo Yoruba 61.097 2.59 3.99 
   403.322 17.01 21.36 
 Eastern (Igbo) States  
22 Abia Igbo 47.875 2.0 2.02 
23 Anambra Igbo 44.333 1.88 2.98 
24 Ebonyi Igbo 43.999 1.86 1.55 
25 Enugu Igbo 45.542 1.9 2.32 
26 Imo Igbo 55.909 2.37 2.81 
   237.658 10.01 11.68 
 Middle Belt (northern Minority) States 
27 Taraba  Mumuye/Jukun 46.272 1.96 1.64 
28 FCT Gwari 69.506 2.9 1.00 
29 Benue Tiv/Idoma 53.845 2.28 3.01 
30 Kogi Igala 47.620 2.01 2.34 
31 Plateau Anga 33.921 1.4 2.27 
   251.164 10.55 10.26 
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 Niger Delta (Southern Minority) States 
32 Delta  Urhobo/Itsekiri 207.205 8.78 2.92 
33 Edo Edo/Ishan 47.673 2.0 2.29 
34 Akwa-Ibom Ibibio/Annang 137.185 5.8 2.80 
35 Bayelsa Ijaw 125.911 5.3 1.21 
36 Cross River Efik/Ekoi 45.546 1.93 2.06 
37 Rivers Ikwere 145.791 6.18 3.70 
   709.311 29.99 14.98 
      
 Total (Dominant Groups) 1,397.542 58.92 74.61 
 Total (Marginal Groups) 960.475 40.54 25.24 
Source: Siri, A. Rustad(2008). 
Table D: Share of Derivation 1960 – 2009. 
YEAR 1960 1975 1979 1980 1993 1999
-
2009 
Derivation 50% 45% onshore.  
100% Offshore 






3% Onshore 13% 
Source: Siri A. Rustad(2008), Field study update, 2009.   






(1) Minimum Responsibility 
of Government (Equality of 
States) 
(2) Population 
(3) Social Development Factor 
(a)Primary School Enrolment 
- Direct Enrolment 
- Inverse Enrolment 
(b) Health (hospital beds) 
(c) Water 
(4) Landmass and Terrain 















































TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Sources: Adapted from Anyanwu (1997: 188, 189& 191), Siri, A. Rustad 
(2008) 
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Table F: Overview Of Mathematical Formula Of    Revenue Allocation In 
















(b)Even progress. North 







 (a) Derivation 
(b) Need 












(a) Derivation, Fiscal 
Independence, North 46% 


























Mr. Binn. H Regional financial 
comparability. 






East 30% West 20%,    
Mid-West 8% 
6. 1968 Federal 
System 
Chief Dina O. Minimum National std 
of basic needs. 







Equality of States 50% 
Population 50% Derivation 




account, off-shore oil 
rent revenue, on-shore 
mining rents. 
Distributable pool account, 
off-shore oil rent Revenue, 
on-shore mining rents. 
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Revenue and minimum 
tax effort (18%) fiscal 
efficiency 15% . Federal 
57% state joint a/c 30% 
Local govt. 10% Special 
grant a/c 3% 
Equality of access to 
development opportunities, 
25% National minimum 




& tax effort 18% Fiscal 
efficiency 15%, Federal 
60%, State joint a/c 30%, 
Local govt. 10% 
10. 1979 Okigbo Pius Federal 53% 
State 30% 
Local govt. 10% 
Special fund 7% 
Nullified by Supreme 
Court as a result of an 
action brought against Fed. 
Govt. by Bendel State 
Govt. 
11. 1981 Federal govt. 
Revenue Act 
1981/82 
 Federal 55% 
State 35% 
Local Govt. 10% 
12. 1984  Special fund for 
Ecological problems & 
development of mineral 
producing areas. 
Special fund for Ecological 
problems & development 
of mineral producing areas  
13. 1988/89 Gen. Danjima Vertical allocation: 
Federal govt. 47%, State 
30%, Local govt. 15%, 
special funds 8%, 
special funds FCT 1%, 
stabilization 0.5%, 
savings 2%, Derivation 
2%, OMPADEC 1.5%, 
Dev. Of Non-oil 0.5%, 
Gen. Ecology 0.5%, 
Horizontal Allocation: 
Equality of States 40%, 
Population 30%, Social 
dev. Factor 10%, Land 
mass & Terrain, Internal 
Revenue effort 20%. 
All accepted except for 
federal 50%, special funds 
5%, savings 0%, 
Derivation 1%, 
Devlopment of Non-oil 
0%, Gen. Ecology 1%. 
14. 1990 FMG headed 
by Gen. 
Babangida 
 Federal 50% 
States 30% 
Local Govt. 15% 
Special funds 5% 
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15. 1997 Gen. Abacha  Federal 48.5% 
States 24% 
Local Govts. 20% 
Special funds 7.5% 
(ecological 2%, FCT 1%, 
stabilization 1.5%, 
National Resources 3%) 
16. 1999 Gen. 
Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
 Federal 48.5% 
States 24% 
Local Govts. 20% 
FCT 1% 

























Local Govt 16% 
Special funds 11.7% : 
FCT 1.2% 
Ecological 1% Natural 
Reserve 1% Solid 
Mineral Dev. 1.5%, 
Basic education 7% 

















Local Govts. 20.60% 
18. 2004  Okonjo Iweala  Federal 52.68% 
States 26.72% 
Local Govts. 20.60% 
 
19. 2005 R.M.A.F.C Federal 53.69% 
States 31.10% 
Local Govts. 15.21% 
No action 
20. 2004 – to date   Federal 52.68% 
States 26.72% 
Local Govts. 20.60% 
Derivation 13% 
Source: Anyafo A.M.O (1996), modified and updated by Field study, 2009. 
 
Jurisdiction Impact of Revenue Allocation on States and LG Councils in Nigeria 
 
Copyright © IAARR, 2010: www.afrrevjo.com                                           93 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
Table G: Household Education attainment criteria in percentages  
FEMALE 






1. North Central 40.9 9.7 5.3 2.5 2248 
2. North East  68.0 4.3 2.7 1.5 2593 
3. North West 72.2 4.2 2.5 1.5 3823 
4. South East 17.8 12.1 16.2 5.6 1314 
5. South South  20.6 12.5 9.4 5.4 2559 
6. South West 23.2 13.6 11.4 7.1 1823 
 MALE  
1. North Central  21.9 9.1 10.1 7.5 2222 
2 North East 50.2 4.6 4.9 4.9 2626 
3. North West 50.0 6.2 5.0 4.4 3670 
4. South East 14.0 16.0 11.5 10.8 1124 
5.  South South 8.7 14.1 13 9.2 2557 
6. South West 13.9 13.4 12.5 10.7 1800 
Significant difference 
between male & female 














Source:  N.D.H.S 2003. 















Electricity 47.2 30.9 42.0 70.2 57.9 79.9 0.001** 















Open well in dwelling 
yards  
      0.020* 
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12.6 15.1 22.9 1.8 3.3 9.2 
Spring 1.5 0.2 0.5 4.8 0.5 1.2 0.093 
Rivers/Stream 34.9 17.3 10.4 10.6 33.0 13.5 0.007** 
Pond/Lake/dam 2.0 1.9 0.4 1.3 1.3 2.1 0.002** 
Sanitation facility: 














Traditional pit toilet  50.1 74.6 74.3 39.8 42.3 39.1 0.001** 
















Cement  48.5 31.5 45.4 53.1 35.9 44.4 0.000*** 
Cooking fuel: 
Electricity  
0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.010* 
Kerosene 16.1 4.8 10.3 51.0 36.2 64.2 0.026* 
Firewood 79.5 92.6 83.8 45.0 61.1 30.7 0.001** 
















Television 23.6 14.00 19.9 52.9 37.3 54.4 0.005** 
Telephone/cell phone 1.6 1.1 2.3 14.0 6.5 12.8 0.042* 
Bicycle  36.5 44.9 40.8 24.7 33.2 5.8 0.003** 
Motorcycle  23.3 13.9 14.9 14.2 14.4 10.4 0.000*** 
Car/truck 8.4 6.3 4.9 21.3 9.7 15.0 0.007** 
Donkey/Horse Camel  0.8 4.8 18.0 0.1 0.0 0 0.233 
Canoe/boat/ship 3.9 1.2 7.5 0.1 12.2 0.2 0.087 
Source: NDHS 2003. 
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 Fig 2: Relationship between Revenue Allocation and Development in the 






































Amount allocated in billions
Education Electricity Tapwater
Linear (Education) Linear (Electricity) Linear (Tapwater)
 
